William Pfaff is the author of The Irony of Manifest Destiny, published in June 2010 by Walker and Company (New York) -- his tenth and culminating work on international politics and the American destiny. He describes the neglected sources and unforeseen consequences of the tragedy towards which the nation's current effort to remake the world to fit America's measure is leading. His previous books and his articles in The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, and his syndicated newspaper column, featured for a quarter century in the globally read International Herald Tribune, have made him one of America's most respected and internationally influential interpreters of world affairs.   [Read more...]
Columns : Staying On In Kabul
on 2013/1/10 15:30:00 (1368 reads)

Paris, January 8, 2013 – The United States has adopted the mission of “global security provider,” according to the most recent Defense Department quadrennial strategy statement. This is a self-nominated role as custodian of a (prospective) global order based on American democracy and capitalism, meant to replace the Westphalian system of absolute national sovereignties and the tradition and institutions of international law as these used to be observed (before the arrival of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and – regrettably – Barack Obama).

This is what the United States has seen itself doing since the first Gulf War (the Kuwait war) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Islamic world. The mission has led successive American governments into invasions, wars, and policies of global intervention, justified by reformist aims.

Not all of the world – certainly not the Islamic world – wants America’s version of global security, which has required repeated American military interventions abroad, provoking guerrilla and terrorist resistance. The existence of this reciprocal cause/effect phenomenon has been widely ignored in Washington, but the consequences have ranged from damaging to disastrous.

American troops are now scheduled to leave Afghanistan, after failing to defeat the Taliban insurrection. President Barack Obama last year announced their withdrawal in 2014. Or he announced more or less their withdrawal -- except for those who stay.


We went through this during the past two years with Iraq, where a U.S. withdrawal was announced, followed by Washington’s attempt to negotiate with the Baghdad government how many American soldiers would actually stay on. Just to train troops, the U.S. said. And to deal with terrorism, if there was more of that (as, surprisingly enough, there has been). In general, to “provide security,” since Iran might make trouble, or the permanence of the boundary with Kurdish-controlled territory might come into question, making further trouble. A question also existed about the long-term security of the oil sector and its exports.

And there might be internal Sh’ia-Sunni difficulties (as indeed there have been). How could Iraq manage without having some Americans to call on if necessary? And finally, the U.S. had spent all that money on building bases and air facilities, and the biggest U.S. Embassy in the world (“bigger than the Vatican City”), so as to have a strategic base in the region, just in case there was some future trouble. The newly democratic Iraqi parliament and government said, “Thank you, but no.”

The United States had the power in place not to take no for an answer. But the American public wasn’t likely to want to fight over this. The whole rationale for eight years in Iraq was to liberate the Iraqis from their home-grown tyranny. And President Obama had promised that the Iraq war would end.

Now there is the same problem with Afghanistan. American forces have been in the country in one or another way since 2001. After the 9/11 attacks, committed by the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda, the Pentagon sent the B-52s to obliterate the Taliban government army, overturned the Taliban (Pashtun) government, and sponsored creation of a new and friendly government dominated by the two main ethnic minorities, the Tajiks and Hazaras, with a presumably tame and symbolic Pashtun president, Hamid Karzai.

President Obama, following his 2008 election, was assured by the U.S. generals in command that they had the war against the Taliban all but wrapped up, provided that he did what they told him to do. He did -- but they didn’t.

The president has now ordered American forces home from Afghanistan. This presumes that either an all-Afghan peace settlement will be negotiated before the end of 2014 or that Afghanistan’s army and police will have defeated the insurrection before then, which no one believes. (The Pentagon today concedes that only one of 23 NATO-trained Afghan brigades currently are capable of functioning on their own).

However in order at best to spare reputations, or at worst to obfuscate humiliation, the Pentagon wishes to keep a substantial residual force in Afghanistan after 2014. It originally proposed 20,000 men and women, but according to The New York Times may be forced by the White House to settle for much less than that.

Unlike in Iraq, President Karzai of Afghanistan wants a large American residual force. When the Americans go, he (if he has survived) or his successor will head a Tajik-Hazaras minority government confronting a Pashtun population numbering some 40 percent of the total population. He will discuss this problem with President Barack Obama when the two meet this week. The last time they met, in May 2011, they signed a “strategic partnership agreement.”

But why does Washington want to stay? Do the foreign policy officials in office not understand that for American troops to stay in Afghanistan to “provide security” is to assure insecurity, since the presence of infidel soldiers inspires hostility and resistance, and President Obama’s drone assassination program has already had a poisonous effect upon the United States’ reputation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

© Copyright 2013 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.

 



For rights to publish the above article To print this article To e-mail this article To print this article (PDF format)
His books